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irrespective of whether these might occur by nationals or aliens in or from outside the sovereign state. 
National security includes such government priorities as maintaining border control, safeguarding against 
pandemic outbreaks, preventing acts of terror, and even discovering and eliminating identification fraud. 
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identification card schemes using smart cards, behavioural tracking for crowd control using closed-circuit 
television (CCTV), electronic tagging for mass transit using radio-frequency identification (RFID), e-
passports for travel using biometrics, and 24x7 tracking of suspected terrorists using global positioning 
systems (GPS). The electorate is informed that these homeland security techniques are in actual fact 
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This special issue of Prometheus is dedicated to the theme of the Social Implications 
of National Security Measures on Citizens and Business. National security measures 
can be defined as those technical and non-technical measures that have been initiated 
as a means to curb breaches in national security, irrespective of whether these might 
occur by nationals or aliens in or from outside the sovereign state. National security 
includes such government priorities as maintaining border control, safeguarding 
against pandemic outbreaks, preventing acts of terror, and even discovering and 
eliminating identification fraud. Governments worldwide are beginning to implement 
information and communication security techniques as a way of protecting and 
enhancing their national security. These techniques take the form of citizen 
identification card schemes using smart cards, behavioural tracking for crowd control 
using closed-circuit television (CCTV), electronic tagging for mass transit using 
radio-frequency identification (RFID), e-passports for travel using biometrics, and 
24x7 tracking of suspected terrorists using global positioning systems (GPS). The 
electorate is informed that these homeland security techniques are in actual fact 
deployed to assist government in the protection of its citizenry and infrastructure. The 
introduction of these widespread measures, however, is occurring at a rapid pace 
without equivalent deliberation over the potential impacts in the longer term on both 
citizens and business.  
 
Governments today maintain a patchwork of information systems and technologies, 
each limited in their scope, and each system claiming seamless interoperability with 
the other. Literally hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars have been used to 
implement band-aid solutions that are workable for the interim but have increasingly 
become an administrative nightmare. With each mass-market solution government 
claims to be saving costs or undergoing optimisation, and with each aftermath of 
implementations the real costs are identified and the alleged benefits diminished. 
Technology observers remain sceptical how some government super-schemes- despite 
their identifiable flaws from the outset- still make it right through to operation.  
 
It has been argued in recent times and with an increasing frequency, that no 
information system is absolutely foolproof, so the introduction of truly global 
solutions is fraught with a range of intrinsic dangers. Moreover while software 
vendors pronounce bug-free systems and hardware vendors continue to lay claim to 
their equipment uptime to adhere to the 99.9999% principle of availability, it is the 
notion of “singularities” that becomes a disturbing factor. That is, what can go wrong 
in times of system outages, what services can still be processed without compromise 
when there is no power and backup battery generators have reached their limits. And 
what happens when someone does penetrate the system’s security defences and goes 
unnoticed. Secondary issues are related to traditional problems such as who has 
access to reading and updating individual fields in personal records ensuring 
confidentiality, the source of origin of data and the integrity of the data, and the 
mechanisms present to protect citizens from system and human errors. At first glance 
these problems appear to be technical in nature, but in practice have more to do with 
the actual processes of decision-making.  
 
 
Since automation, particularly computerisation, governments have increasingly 
looked towards cradle-to-grave surveillance; and now thanks to new and improved 
ICT capabilities and innovative government-to-business (G2B) relationships, they 
have 24x7 surveillance as well. Terrorism (from whatever ideological perspective we 
might approach the subject), has acted as a dominant catalyst for the widespread 
adoption of information and communication technology (ICT) since September 11
th
 
2001. With each new adoption of ICT, vendors of networks, hardware and software 
(whose principal goal is to seek profit maximisation) count the potential revenues 
from the opportunity to implement nation-wide solutions. In addition, a deregulated 
marketplace now allows for private enterprises to partially provision (or even fully in 
some instances) government services, giving rise to the possibility of vested interests 
by a number of stakeholders. Government offshore and outsourcing agreements by 
their very nature pose a risk to national security, despite the legalities of service level 
agreements (SLA) and other contractual obligations. Business, too, is now expected to 
cooperate with government agencies to provide detailed lists of transactions by 
suspected persons such as mobile telephone calls or SMS (including complete 
conversations), bank and credit-card statements, e-mail/ voicemail, and other personal 
information such as sites browsed on the Internet. Warrants can now be issued by 
federal judges to federal and state law enforcement agencies authorising the 
interception of communications by means of any “telecommunication device” used by 
persons of interests, and other innocent third parties linked to persons of interest. 
 
Concepts of privacy, at least in the tradition of western liberalism, touch on freedom, 
trust, the right to be left alone, obedience, and free will. And today few things are 
truly private in the more literal sense of “confidentiality” and “secrecy”.  Whatever 
George Orwell might have imagined in his satirical and futuristic 1984, are we, 
ourselves, about to embark on a prison-like existence behind virtual bars? It has less 
to do with having anything to hide and more to do with the feeling that Big Brother is 
watching, controlling our private lives. We have laws for stalking, and we have laws 
for wire-tapping and digital recordings but what have happened to our laws on 
privacy. Privacy laws seem to be currently in conflict with lawful interception, and 
have certainly not kept pace with new ICTs. These emerging technologies will also 
inevitably give rise to new expressions of mental illness- for example the ‘legitimate’ 
preoccupation/ obsessiveness of being watched by someone else, all the time. And 
this will not be through a window but a camera- a supposed intelligent system that can 
compute certain images and conclude something meaningful about you and what you 
represent: like the so-called fact that you are linked to suspected criminals because 
you attend a football match and happen to look like someone else, because somehow 
your biometric has been permanently ‘changed’ in the official back-end system and 
you are denied access or entry because you simply do not add up, and about being at 
the wrong place at the wrong time and find yourself being questioned for something 
you never did. The potential scenarios are limited only by our imagination; and the 
ghosts in the machine. These will not be mere typographical errors to be leisurely 
brushed away. 
 
Numbers, pure and simple, are all-pervading. Everywhere we turn we have numbers, 
and nowadays not only numbers but passwords. It is a reality many of us have learnt 
to live with and have with time taken for granted. We have gone through waves of 
innovation that have related names to numbers, numbers to smart cards- even our 
biometric pattern is denominational. Currently we are at the brink of infringing a 
sensitive area of privacy. We are now expected to give something away freely, that is 
rightfully ours- our own personal biometric. To some degree this is equivalent to 
being asked to transfer our “power of attorney” to someone or something we do not 
have control over. In this case, it is not a question of whether a citizen trusts their 
government to act appropriately or not, but it has to do with the basics of human 
rights. This is a technological anomaly, given that many of us still cringe in attaching 
a copy of our hand-written signature in a digital message, and now we are being asked 
to hand over something of far greater value in the form of unique biometric minutiae. 
It will not be too long before we are requested and then required to provide more than 
one biometric pattern for the ease of using multimodal biometric solutions 
internationally. This means that we are progressively losing the right to be known by 
our own name, but also the impression that we no longer own a part of our own body 
(even if outwardly this appears to be computational).  
 
Realistically, what could come next? The cognizant go-ahead to grant a third party 
authority, such as a government or service provider, virtually unreserved control over 
our personhood by permitting RFID transponders to penetrate the skin? This would 
not simply equate to “dataveillance” but to “überveillance”- an above and beyond 
omnipresent 24x7 surveillance where the explicit concerns for misinformation, 
misinterpretation, and information manipulation, are ever more multiplied and where 
potentially the technology is embedded into our body. Who would own such a 
comprehensive information system? Who would have the right to make amendments 
to the databases? Trenchant arguments that such extreme scenarios only turn up in the 
active imaginations of civil libertarians, conspiracy theorists, and religious 
fundamentalists are steadily losing ground. Device implants for medical purposes 
have been readily available since the 1970s, today the difference is that they are as 
small as a grain of rice and manifestly more powerful and can be used as much for ID 
purposes as any other application. 
 
The philosophical debate for most technologists is whether a system of moral 
principles should have any considerable place in the new government mandated ICT 
implementations. Simply stated one of the primary questions in an ethical discussion 
of this type would be, is technology neutral? We seem to eschew deliberations over 
what is right or wrong or good or bad and are hesitant to critically engage with 
questions of morality. We would rather thrash out issues of whether society shapes 
technology or technology shapes society, and while this is an important area of study, 
we might be missing the mark. Are questions of future sustainability too difficult for 
us to discuss if they involve bringing some type of ideology into the equation? Should 
we not also be asking ourselves what sort of future we hope to generate and to live in? 
Many engaged in the terrorism debate are so engrossed in the topic that they suffer 
from a type of tunnel vision without too much consideration for the externalities that 
might occur from particular ‘solutions’. The growing interconnectedness of systems 
means that any ICT solution proposed by powerful nation states will be rapidly 
adopted by other nations. Truly global solutions while seemingly convenient on the 
surface, lend themselves to wide-ranging dangers. Certainly, policies and procedures 
are important, so are laws and regulations, and standards, and guidelines but these all 
seem to be more exactly “reactionary” to the status quo. Studies have recently shown 
that at the height of terrorist events or other national security issues, public sentiment 
is swayed by media coverage, the public perception itself, and government statements. 
As a result sweeping changes are introduced in a short period of time, particularly 
“changes” with large pieces of legislative content. There never seems to be enough 
time for additional public consultation, for broad debate and discussion; time to 
consider the consequences of the implementation of these far reaching decisions and 
for the scrutiny of their overall effect on the community in the long-term.  
 
We seem to have become captive to a whirlpool cycle of surplus change, a capital 
accumulation of power house capabilities without the follow-on forethought. New 
government and business challenges are created as emerging technologies and are 
prematurely released to the market, still newer technologies are invented to overcome 
the challenges, laws are instituted to set the bounds of how technology should and 
should not be used and people are ultimately expected to learn to live with the 
implications and complications. Information and communication security measures 
adopted in haste in response to terrorism and other national security breaches have 
only acted to increase this cycle of change. There is also an underlying paradox in all 
of this which political sceptics would have already noted. Though in recent years 
governments are ostensibly committed to reducing state power, they have in reality 
increased it massively. 
 
 
This issue of Prometheus introduces the reader to a wide array of perspectives on the 
topic of National Security from interdisciplinary fields of study, including philosophy, 
sociology, history, law, information and communication technology, and business. 
The volume acknowledges the difficulties of interdisciplinary research, especially the 
differences in approach and methodology, but also clearly evidences to the coherence 
in findings between schools of thought seemingly poles apart. The issue contains 
seven papers, proceedings from a workshop that was held in Australia on the 29
th
 of 
May 2006, sponsored by the Research Network for a Secure Australia (RNSA). This 
issue will bring readers up-to-date on the current and potential status of information 
security measures, their implications on citizens and business, and their impact on 
legislation and privacy at a local and global level. Those stakeholders involved in 
implementation should be aiming to ethically integrate new technologies into society 
or run the risk potential for enhanced national security to come at the cost of freedom. 
There are many questions linked to this trade-off. Some of these include: How much 
technology is too much and whether technology is really the answer to all our 
problems? Can we legitimately claim that system safeguards ensure error-free 
databanks in monolithic-style systems? How does society ensure that authorities use 
the data in global systems appropriately and that stakeholders do not misuse their 
powers of read/write access? How voluntary is enrolment in these new schemes and 
how interlinked are citizen benefits to participation? And finally, what trajectory will 
the implementation of national citizen systems follow. Where to next? And what level 
of invasiveness into our personal lives are we willing to accept in the name of 
security. 
 
Michael and Michael’s paper is a historical review of prominent identification 
techniques throughout the ages and how they have been used, or misused, by people 
in authority. Jackson and Ligertwood’s paper is a comparative legal study on the 
proposed UK citizen ID card and proposed Australia Card. Wigan and Clarke look at 
the broader context of information and security techniques in transportation and 
present the interconnectedness of seemingly disparate schemes. Tootell’s paper 
focuses on the study of location-based services in national security, and calls for the 
use of new methodological approaches to national security problems using the socio-
critical theory approach which considers the lifeworld view. Bronitt and Stellios’ 
paper analyses the Telecommunications Interception and Access (TIA) Act of 
Australia and reveals the increasing powers of government authorities with a view 
toward the need for changes to legislation. Rix follows with a studied criticism of the 
new anti-terrorism laws in Australia with respect to the community legal sector. 
Resnyansky completes the contributions by identifying the weaknesses of using solely 
quantitative modelling techniques for combating terrorism and focuses on the notion 
of critical reflexivity as a way to uncover the root causes of breaches in national 
security. 
 
While the volume for the greater part is dedicated to an Australian context, global 
events and examples are used throughout to illustrate the major issues. In fact the 
lessons gained from the Australian context, can be applied comparatively to other 
nation states, particularly given the similarities and speed with which the UK and 
USA have paralleled their roll-outs of laws and proposed amendments to laws and 
adoption of information and communication security measures. The consequences of 
these initiatives will take some time to be felt but already we can predict with some 
confidence what some of the shortfalls will be. Postmodernist theory might have us 
believe that the profession of history is in crisis and that its methods are outmoded, 
but as Richard Evans and others have effectively argued, the discipline can teach us 
many lessons and provide us with “genuine insights”. And in the context of 
technology itself, thinkers in the sociological tradition of Lewis Mumford and Jacques 
Ellul continue to challenge us to stop for a moment and to critically evaluate the 
unchecked consequences upon our civilization of an “artificial environment”.  
 
Whatever happens, whatever road is taken or ‘not taken’, the irreversible 
consequences of our “technicized” society will be felt by future generations. This is 
perhaps a traditional problem that has less to do with technology and more to do with 
people. Are we continually building new defences with a “catch me if you can” way 
of thinking, and “here, try penetrating my latest solutions”, or are we genuine about 
peaceful resolutions which look at the root causes of national security concerns? The 
question is how much room are we truly leaving ourselves for future modification and 
change, if we go ahead and implement what we are proposing today? For the record, 
no one is debunking technology; there are no neo-Luddites here. The basic point is, to 
remain the masters over that which we create, and to not allow for the machine to 
dictate the terms and boundaries of our existence.  
 
 
